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Land Markets and Agrarian Backwardness  
(Spain, 1900-1936) 
 
1. Introduction 
A substantial literature underlines the fact that efficient market institutions are both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for agrarian development (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985; North, 
1990). It is also argued that institutional disparity is the main culprit for the enormous differences 
in agricultural output per worker around the world.1 The presence of well-defined property rights 
would lead to more efficient resource use and provide far greater incentives to undertake 
investments and innovations that would, in turn, increase agrarian productivity. Following this 
line of reasoning, international agencies, like the World Bank, have emphasized the role of 
institutional change causing the emergence of free factor and commodity markets and well-
defined land property rights as critical for technological improvements in agriculture (Besley, 
1995; Deininger, 2003a). 
Therefore, efficient land markets are considered essential for agrarian development.2 A 
correctly-functioning land market can significantly improve the rural economy of developing 
countries in several ways (Deininger, 2003b). First, when the ownership distribution of land is 
not optimal, land markets can allocate land to more productive producers and thus increase 
overall efficiency and welfare. Second, the option of sold land facilitates the reallocation of labour 
from rural to urban jobs, a situation which is likely to help the development of the urban 
economy. Third, the possibility of land transfer makes land investment more attractive and 
encourages the shift of capital from the rest of the economy to agriculture. And finally, if land is 
easy to put onto the market, it can be used as collateral for credit operations which could also be 
offered at lower cost. In contrast, badly-functioning land markets cause substantial entry barriers 
for landless participants and dramatic price distortions which are sometimes translated into 
monopolistic gains on the part of landowners, considerable fluctuations in land prices, and 
distress land sales by poor peasants.  
                                            
1 In 1985, labour productivity in agriculture in the richest 5 percent of countries was 72 times that of the 
poorest 5 percent of countries (Restuccia et al. 2008). 
2 In this paper, we will treat land markets and land sales markets as synonyms and will only analyse land 
sales markets. However, it should be noted that badly-functioning land sales markets will be replaced in 
their pro-growth functions by efficient land rental markets (Deininger, 2003a).  
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An alternative view of institutions, however, is that market institutions are not a necessary 
and sufficient condition for economic development. For example, Shiue and Keller (2007: 1189) 
argue that “[institutions for market exchange] rather than being a key condition for subsequent 
growth, improvements in market performance and growth occurred simultaneously.” In a similar 
vein, several authors (Landes 1969; Mokyr 1990) have argued that institutions supporting 
technical progress are equally important but are intrinsically different from institutions supporting 
market integration and efficiency. On the other hand, many authors place a great deal of 
emphasis on geographical determinants, such as climate, topography, rainfall, and soil quality as a 
source of agrarian backwardness. They argue that the adoption of the agrarian technologies 
created in developed countries on a worldwide scale is difficult because such technologies are 
suited to Northern Europe’s geography and climatic conditions (Diamond, 1997; Gallup, Sachs 
and Mellinger, 1999). Finally, another group of researchers pointed out the importance of 
population size and density, and the related pressure on natural resources, as a causal factor for 
the development of new technological improvements and the adoption of more advanced 
technologies already available (Boserup 1981). So, in regions with relatively low population 
density, the most advanced technologies were not adopted and agricultural productivity remained 
low.  
Spanish agriculture during the early decades of the 20th century provides a unique 
opportunity to study the influence of land markets on agrarian backwardness. At first sight, the 
institutional structure of Spanish land markets after the liberal reform of the 19th century was 
comparable to that prevalent in the most developed countries (see section 2 below) but 
agriculture remained relatively backward during the early decades of the 20th century.3  
Politicians and economic historians have focused the debate on the importance of the 
institutional structure of rural Spain.4 Many attributed the poor performance of agriculture to 
Spanish agrarian institutions, and hence to the failure of market-oriented liberal reform of land 
markets. Implicitly, they believed that land sales markets failed miserably and that the unmitigated 
                                            
3 According to O’Brien and Prados (1993: 531), agricultural output per worker in Spain in 1930 was about 
two-thirds of that in the four major Western European economies (Britain, France, Germany and Italy). 
Differences were even more pronounced in land productivity: on average, Western Europe output per 
hectare was 2.67 times greater than Spain’s. These low agrarian productivity levels were accompanied by a 
comparatively large share of the male working population in agriculture, with figures close to, or above, 
fifty percent up to 1930 (Simpson 1995: Table 1.2.). 
4 See, among others, Carrión (1932), Costa (1911-1912), Fontana (1985), Garrabou (1999), Nadal (1975), 
Pérez Picazo (1990), Robledo (1993), Ruíz Torres (1994) and Villares (1997).  
 3
operation of agrarian factor markets would generate equity and efficiency problems.5 In 
particular, they claimed that large Southern estates suffered diseconomies of scale and that 
substantial efficiency gains could be obtained by transforming them into small landholdings, 
where extensive production could be replaced by intensive farming.6 Carmona and Simpson 
(2007) have challenged the traditional view, underlining that Spanish agrarian institutions were 
able to adapt to economic change and did not exert such a negative impact on agrarian 
development (2007: 306-312). Other authors have also denied the institutional explanation, 
emphasizing the importance of geographical determinants (Pujol et al., 2001), the weak urban and 
international demand for agricultural commodities (Carmona and Simpson, 2007), the absence of 
rural out-migration (Tortella 2000), and agrarian protectionism (Simpson 1997) in explaining 
Spanish agrarian backwardness.   
Although a fair amount has been written on Spanish agriculture during the early 20th 
century, a quantitative assessment of the performance of land markets in Spain is still lacking. For 
this reason, this paper studies the major aspects of land markets in order to assess whether they 
worked properly. We will consider, firstly, spatial market integration, using cointegration analysis 
with data on average land prices, and then, whether land prices were driven by market 
fundamentals (that is, if the land pricing system was efficient). In this sense, our results indicate 
that land markets worked properly in Spain during the early decades of the 20th century. For this 
reason, we conclude that the backwardness of Spanish agriculture should not be attributed to the 
operation of land markets.  
 
2. The Evolution of Spanish Land Markets 
The definition of secure property rights to land is a necessary condition for the 
development of an efficient land market. According to Deininger (2003a: 25), the definition of 
land property rights requires: the duration of land rights; a clear identification of boundaries and 
limits of plots (which also implies the formal recording of boundaries); the individual assignment 
of land rights; and the existence of enforcement institutions. These enforcement institutions 
should resolve land rights disputes in order to avoid the emergence of land related social conflict. 
Institutions for enforcing land property rights were well developed in Western European 
countries prior to industrialization (Federico, 2005: 144). In many respects, the land market 
institutions of early Modern Europe were more advanced than those prevalent in today’s 
                                            
5 A variant of this argument is provided by Tedde (1994), who argued that land market institutions were 
well designed but corruption in the application of regulations hurt the poor. 
6 The classical account is that of Carrión (1932). 
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developing countries. The right of cultivation was transferable and the boundaries of plots were 
sometimes clearly defined and even registered in documents like notaries’ records. However, land 
property was far from perfect because the co-existence of several rights over land was common 
and enforcement of land rights was sometimes difficult. Furthermore, the transfer of land was 
sometimes heavily taxed.7 The absence of a universal system of registration of land titles 
increased information costs and prevented the use of land as collateral (Peset, 1978). Finally, 
much agricultural land did not form part of the market because the church did not sell its lands 
and the landed elite developed legal mechanisms, like strict settlement, to ensure the continuity of 
family estates over generations and to guarantee its exclusivity in wealth and political power. In 
these conditions, land prices overreacted to local shocks and markets were imperfect and 
inefficient given that the limited amount of sellers and buyers severely restricted competition for 
land. For all these reasons, land markets did not work in a way that the property rights school 
prescribes as encouraging economic growth.  
In Spain, the transformation of the organization of pre-industrial land markets spanned 
more than one century from the mid-18th century to the mid-19th century. The development of 
formal registration began in 1768 with the creation of the registry of mortgages (the Contaduría de 
Hipotecas) by the Bourbons (Peset, 1978: 699). The new system of registration was cheap and 
hence reduced information and transaction costs, but was not universal or even widely used. It 
served to improve the effectiveness of local land markets but did not generate a supra-local 
market for land. The process of institutional change in land markets accelerated during the early 
decades of the 19th century. The authorities derogated the legal apparatus of the Old Regime that 
allowed the coexistence of different property rights over land, the remaining feudal rights, many 
of the old forms of land tenancy, the common land rights, and the restrictions on land sales, grain 
commerce and employment.8 Furthermore, to alleviate their budget problems and to finance wars 
and infrastructures, successive governments put the properties of the Church (1837-1845) and 
communal lands (1855-1857), which were sold in auctions, onto the market. Finally, the old local 
system of registration was replaced by a cheap, universal and homogeneous system of land 
registry in 1865 (Bono, 1979). At the end of the 19th century, the institutional framework of 
Spanish land markets was as developed as those prevalent in other European countries.  
It should also be underlined that the registration of transactions was very useful and 
relatively inexpensive. First, registration solved disputes about property rights and gave legal 
backup to any transaction. Second, without registration, it was not possible to use land as 
                                            
7 Beaur (2003) for France; Ruiz Torres (1981) and Peset and Graullera (1980) for Spain. 
8 See, for example, García Sanz (1985) and Peset (1992). 
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collateral for a loan or sell it to covenant of grace. In addition, without registration, former 
owners could override the actual rights of property, despite having received the payments, by 
asking for legal right of withdrawal.9 Finally, the payment of taxes on land transmission could be 
made in the same registry office, which saved time and provided legal backup to the new owners. 
The condition of the legal right of withdrawal also limited the possibility of price underreporting 
and tax evasion because land could be repurchased by the former owner/s at the registered price 
(not at the price actually paid). 
To what extent was land registration used by economic agents? Contemporary literature, 
including the reports of the registrars’ association themselves, mentioned the fact that many small 
owners preferred to use the services of the registry only when necessary.10 However, we believe 
that the complaint of registrars regarding the low rate of formalization of property land titles is 
not inconsistent with the fact that practically all landholding transactions were, in fact, registered. 
In consequence, the level of formalization of Spanish land markets was very high. Note that, in 
theory, market participants could only register a market transaction if the property had been 
previously recorded (Martinez Alcubilla 1892-94: II, 1076). On many occasions, however, the 
first registration was made at the time of the first market transaction of the corresponding 
landholding. In other words, when a new transaction took place, the property was yet to be 
registered correctly because, for example, the succession of inheritances had yet to be recorded. 
In consequence, landholdings were registered to put them onto the market (or to use as collateral 
in mortgages). In favour of this interpretation is the fact that the trend in sales by year/province 
showed strong similarities with the trend in the registration of inherited estates. At first sight, this 
coincidence does not make any sense given that the latter relies primarily on mortality rates and 
not on land market conditions. 
  
[HERE TABLE 1] 
 
Table 1 compares the amount of registered inherited landholdings during the whole 
thirty-year period and the amount of registered market transactions. From the last column, one 
can observe that only a minority of landholdings (13 percent) was inherited, and registered as 
such, in thirty years. Large regional differences in inheritance rates can be observed, from a 
                                            
9 Dirección General de los Registros Civil y de la Propiedad y del Notariado, (1889-1890), Valladolid: 109 
and Sevilla: 1890. 
10 Costa (1890) and Dirección General de los Registros Civil y de la Propiedad y del Notariado, (1889-
1890) (1906). 
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minimum of 4 percent in the North region and 9 percent in North Castile, to a maximum of 40 
percent in Andalusia, a difference of 10 to 1 between the maximum and minimum. However, 
these differences cannot be explained by different mortality rates and are very similar to the 
number of sales (column 4), which would confirm the practice of registering only inherited 
landholdings when necessary for conducting sales and other market transactions. 
The fact is that the land market was very active during this period.11 The average amount 
of landholdings sold (and registered) between 1904 and 1933 was about 166,000 per year; that is, 
about 4,000 units per province/year. Huelva was the province with, on average, fewest sales per 
year (1,140) and Valencia the most (11,900). If one considers the total value of land sold, the 
average annual sales of 194.6 billion Ptas. in 1910, Seville remained the province with the highest 
volume of sales (an average of 13.2 million Ptas. per year) and Cuenca the lowest (an average of 
half a million Ptas. per year). The average amount of hectares put onto the market was close to 
half a million per year. 
  
[HERE TABLE 2] 
 
Table 2 presents several alternative measures of the dynamism of land markets in Spanish 
regions. First, we compute the percentage of the total stock of existing properties that, on 
average, were exchanged every year. Second, we estimate the value of the total amount of sales 
over the agrarian production for two benchmarks (1908-1913 and 1931). At first sight, large 
differences between regions are clear. The most expensive regions in terms of price per plot (see 
table 2) are also the most dynamic.12 In particular, Andalusia with 2 percent of holdings sold 
every year and the Mediterranean with 1.23 percent outperformed the North with only 0.2 
percent. Seville, in Andalusia, was the province with the highest transaction rates (about 5 percent 
                                            
11 It could be also very useful to compare the figures for the period (table 2, column 1 above) with the last 
available data for Spanish land markets from the Spanish Statistical Office (INE). During the year 2007, 
189,785 plots of the approximate available total of 40 million were sold; that is, 0.47 percent of the total. 
Note that this is practically the same percentage as the average for the period 1904-34. 
12 Several contemporaries (Costa, 1890) had already observed this point. Furthermore, they attributed this 
low dynamism of certain markets to failures in the system of land registration. From their point of view, 
our statistics underestimate total purchases in this region in an unknown proportion. However, this trend 
of low dynamism is also replicated today (when the registry is universal) and in the 1950s; consequently, it 
is difficult to attribute it to low registration rates. Instead, we hypothesize that it is a consequence of the 
prevalence in these regions of certain long-term contracts (like the Foro) that discouraged the sale of land 
and encouraged the transference of these land rights (Villares, 1982). 
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per year), while the Galician provinces recorded the lowest rates in the North with about 0.1 
percent per year. This picture is not greatly altered if we employ, instead, the relative participation 
of land sales in agricultural output (columns 2 and 3). Andalusia and the Mediterranean region 
were the regions where sales represented a major proportion of agricultural output. Northern 
Castile, and not the North, is the region where these sales were relatively less important. 
Differences between regions were also minor if we consider agricultural output instead of the 
amount of plots. 
 
[HERE TABLE 3] 
 
Table 3 shows the regional distribution of land sales for the whole period. The lion’s 
share of the market is in hands of Andalusia and the Mediterranean regions, which accounted for 
57 percent of the total value of sales. Instead, if one considers the number of plots put onto the 
market, the Mediterranean and Northern Castile represent 45 percent of the total. The picture 
changes again if one considers hectares put onto the market because Andalusia and Southern 
Castile concentrated more than 60 percent of the total. On average, the most expensive plots 
were located in Andalusia (with an average price that was about four times those prevalent in the 
cheapest region, Northern Castile). At provincial level, the most expensive areas are the most 
industrialized, namely Biscay with about 4,700 Ptas. per plot and Barcelona with 4,200 Ptas. per 
plot. In contrast, the cheapest province was in Northern Castile (Segovia, with only 215 Ptas. per 
plot). Considering, instead, the price per hectare, the most expensive were the North and 
Mediterranean regions whereas the cheapest were Southern Castile and Andalusia. The price per 
hectare seems inversely correlated with the size of farms.  
 
[HERE FIGURE 1] 
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of Spanish land sales from 1904 to 1935. The trend in the 
number of sales experienced a decline, especially between 1904 and the end of the First World 
War, followed by a period of stabilization and recovery during the 1920s and again a drop from 
1929 onwards. Over the entire period, the number of sales declined by 30 percent. The total real 
value of landholdings sold over the entire period also shows a similar trend with those observed 
in the case of the number of sales. However, there are two unexpected peaks that correspond to 
the years 1927 and 1930-31, when a legal change provided the opportunity to appropriate 
 8
remaining communal lands (the so-called “Montes públicos”).13 So, from 1904 to 1934, the total 
value of sales (in constant prices) dropped by 40 percent.  
 
[HERE FIGURE 2] 
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of average land prices per holding and per hectare for Spain 
from 1904 to 1935. Average prices per landholding experienced several cycles: declining from 
1904 to 1908, rising again up to 1913, and falling until 1916 (this year marking the minimum of 
the period). In the late 1910s prices recovered once more. During the 1920s and the first years of 
the Second Republic (up to 1934), prices were affected by the aforementioned shocks but 
maintained, on average, values well above those prevalent in the previous decade. In sum, average 
prices were slightly higher in the 1930s than in the first decade of the 20th century. 
 
[HERE FIGURES 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f] 
 
However, regional experiences were very different. Regarding the amount of properties 
sold (Figures 3a and 3b above), in Andalusia, the Ebro Valley and Southern Castile, the amount 
of properties put onto the market was quite stable up to 1929, when it declined spectacularly 
across all regions (probably as a consequence of the uncertainty caused by the Great Depression 
and the transition to a new political regime). The Mediterranean region experienced an expansion 
of its market while in the North and Northern Castile the markets shrank dramatically until 1918. 
Particularly noticeable is the evolution of Castilian land markets where the amount of 
landholdings sold fell from a peak of 55,000 in 1904 to fewer than 28,000 in 1922. What our 
source does not indicate is whether the figures of 1904 indicate a maximum, or the continuation 
of a downward trend initiated in the previous years. A substantial literature underlines the 
negative impact of the Grain Invasion on small farmers throughout the country, but especially in 
the North-Castilian provinces. It is likely that this crisis could have triggered an expansion of 
distress land sales in the zones where small properties were predominant (García Orallo, 2008).  
According to the evolution in the value of sales (Figures 3c and 3d), Spanish regions 
could be divided into two groups, although all regions shared the same declining trend in land 
market activity up to First World War. Since then, three regions maintained the same low levels 
                                            
13 Interestingly, this unexpected increase in average prices does not follow the typical speculative 
behaviour of bubbles (Eatwell et al. 1998) because the rise in average land prices was not accompanied by 
a parallel increase in the amount of plots traded. 
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throughout the period (the Ebro Valley, Northern and Southern Castile) while the remaining 
three regions (Andalusia, the Mediterranean and the North) shared a moderate expansion of their 
land markets. Note that this distribution of declining/expanding regions closely resembles the 
geography of dry farming in Spain. Regions specializing in dry farming, particularly in the 
extensive production of grain, experienced a period of stagnation while regions with a more 
diversified production fared much better, regardless of whether they specialized in mixed 
husbandry (North) or fruits and Mediterranean products (Andalusia and Mediterranean regions).  
The evolution of prices is, apparently, more synchronized across Spanish regions (Figures 
3e and 3f). Thus, peaks, plateaus and drops in real land prices were shared by the majority of 
regions. This result suggests the existence of a certain integration in the Spanish land sales 
market, but we will review this issue in more depth in the following section.  
 
3. Conceptual Foundations 
Our objective is, then, to investigate whether Spanish land markets were efficient or not. 
However, it is much easier to describe the effect of markets on efficiency than to measure it. 
Datasets do not habitually contain measures of “efficiency”, nor do surveys have accurate 
measures of how well markets work. We will, therefore, use some simple economic theories to 
suggest ways in which inefficient behaviour in land markets can be captured empirically. Before 
proceeding, given that we will employ land prices to study the efficiency of land markets, we need 
to discuss several basic issues concerning which factors play a role in determining agrarian land 
values.  
Most of the literature which attempts to identify and quantify the determinants of 
agrarian land prices is based on the capitalization approach. The cornerstone of this approach is 
the principle that the price of agrarian land equals the net present value (NPV) of the stream of 
all future net returns to land, as in the case of any other asset (Featherstone and Baker, 1987). 
According to the NPV, the price of land is a direct function of the rents that could be obtained 
from the use of land for productive activities; that is, the higher the rents, the higher the land 
price; and that the price of land is a function of the inverse of the interest rate,14 meaning that 
higher interest rates will mean lower land prices.   
More specifically, the NPV is calculated by estimating the future stream of cash returns 
resulting from ownership of the asset, and discounting this cash flow based on the level of 
                                            
14 Note that, in a competitive world, the market interest rate is the basis for the discount rate, because it 
represents the opportunity cost of investments. 
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uncertainty inherent in the expected returns. This model is summarized by the following 
equation: 
1             =  	 

∞



 
 
where Vt is the equilibrium land value at the beginning of time period t; Rt is the land rent paid in 
period t, α is a constant discount factor equal to 1/(1+i) where i is the constant real discount rate 
and determined elsewhere, and Et is the conditional expectations operator based on information 
available at time t. This equation (1) can be further simplified, by assuming a long-run equilibrium 
between the real value of land and its real return (denote V* and R* as the long-run equilibrium 
value and a constant expectation of equilibrium return). The equation simplifies to: 
 
2 v = β0 + β1r, 
 
where v=lnV*, r=lnR*, β1=1 and β0=ln(1/i) where ln is the natural logarithm.  
It should be noted, however, that this formulation does not necessarily imply that the 
market price of agrarian land will always equal the present value of the future rents because there 
could be different factors affecting the market price of land that do not affect the present value 
measure (Burt, 1986). To be more precise, land rents result from the aggregation of two factors 
(Melichar, 1979): the net residual income (R1) and the net capital gains (R2). 
The net residual income (R1) could be simply defined as the net return to land, accruing 
from the residual income after subtracting the return to farm labour, management and inputs 
(except land) that take part in the agricultural production process. In perfect markets, R1 equals 
the marginal productivity of land times the net output prices; that is the value of land marginal 
product (VLMP). This long-run equilibrium rent is called, in the economic literature, a market 
fundamental because it is based upon fundamental economic variables (Featherstone and Baker, 
1987). With constant land supply,15 VLMP is a function of technological improvements, the cost 
of inputs (including labour and management), the marketing system (more market efficiency then 
less marketing costs), the distance and transportation systems, the market information system 
(which reduces uncertainty and also the probability of an inefficient transaction), tariffs and other 
macroeconomic measures affecting agricultural production and prices. The local demographic 
                                            
15 Obviously, an increase in land supply led to a decrease in land prices. Furthermore, given that land 
expansion commonly took place in low-quality, marginal or relatively isolated land, average prices 
decreased more than predicted using constant quality supply shifts. 
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conditions also have a direct effect on VLMP because a growing population demands more 
agricultural goods and space for non-agricultural uses (Plantinga et al., 2002).  
On the other hand, the net capital gains (R2) could be defined as the change in land value 
motivated by variations in opportunity costs or inflation (Lloyd et al., 1991). This rent component 
is more related to land assets used as stores of wealth than to land used as a productive factor. 
For this reason, it is sometimes called the non-fundamental price. In consequence, R2 responds 
to expectations about the changes in the value of land due to changes in prices and opportunity 
costs in other economic sectors. Even though there are many varieties of speculative behaviour 
that could provoke actual land prices to diverge from market fundamental values, the stochastic 
bubble model developed by Blanchard and Watson (1982) and the fads model developed by 
Summers (1986) are the most cited models in the literature (Roche and McQuinn, 2001). Each 
effect stems from a different type of expectations that the relevant economic agents (decision 
makers) have and from the available information in the market (Featherstone and Baker, 1987). 
Bubbles are of explosive nature and appear when investors trade in high volumes at prices that 
are considerably at variance with fundamental values (Roche and McQuinn, 2001).16 Instead, a 
fad is characterized by slower but more sustained price increases and falls (West, 1988). In 
particular, this could be the case of speculative movements of land prices based on the 
expectations that potential investors have about the trend of real land prices under inflation 
(Lloyd, 1994). There are also other non-fundamental factors, other than speculative behaviour, 
which could affect the evolution of land prices, such as taxation (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1993), 
transaction costs, liquidity constraints (Shalit and Schmitz, 1982), and institutional framework 
(Feder and Feeny, 1991).  
From this short review of the determinants of land prices, we can derive two central 
principles for our analysis. First, in perfect (efficient) markets, the actual price of land equals the 
net present value of the stream of all future net returns to land, which should be equal to the 
VLMP. Second, a land buyer will be willing to pay the full capital value of land, the total net rents 
(R), land as a productive factor and as store of wealth, because he/she will obtain full benefits of 
both uses of land. On the other hand, an owner-cultivator (or a tenant) will be willing to pay a 
rent only based on R1, without considering R2 because he only receives the benefits derived from 
using the land as a productive factor (Castle and Hoch 1982). Thus, if land prices are well above 
their fundamental value, land markets do not redistribute land to the most capable farmers but 
                                            
16 Eatwell et al. (1998) define a bubble as “a sharp rise in the price of an asset or a range of assets in a 
continuous process, with the initial rise generating expectation of further rises and attracting new buyers. 
(…) The rise is usually followed by a reversal of expectations and a sharp decline in the price”. 
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those with enough wealth (or credit) to cope with the non-fundamental price. Furthermore, 
financial agents would not lend money to future producers because it is likely that they will be 
unable to pay for the total value of land (farmers only get R1 from production but not R2).  
 To test the efficiency of the land price system (that is, the efficiency of land markets), we 
will consider, first, land markets’ spatial integration and we will then explore the fundamental 
determinants of land prices directly. The fact is that if land markets are spatially integrated and 
price fundamentals explain land price behaviour, one should conclude that land markets are, 
indeed, efficient.  
 
4. Measuring the Integration of Spanish Land markets 
The Law of One Price is one of the most common ways of measuring market integration 
(Moodley et al., 2000). According to this law, markets are considered spatially integrated for a 
specific factor if a causal relationship between prices in different spatial markets can be measured. 
If there is a shock that causes two prices to diverge, the effect will be temporary in a well-defined 
market and price differentials will eventually converge. The speed of convergence of these two 
prices defines the degree of market integration.  
The Law of One Price could also be applied to the analysis of land prices. If non-
fundamental rents play a part in the formation of land prices, and given that the different types of 
land are unevenly distributed across space, land prices may not converge when a boom/bust 
shock takes place (Schimtz, 1995). In other words, when land markets are not integrated, 
property prices deviate from fundamentals independently from changes in risk premium in other 
markets. In particular, researchers have documented booms in real estate markets based on 
“myopic” or “rule of thumb” extrapolation of recent values and trends (Hendershott, 1994). 
Indeed, when this happens, land markets do not work properly and, hence, are not efficient. 
However, it is also possible, at least theoretically, that bubbles and fads were nationwide giving 
the impression of fundamental rents integration when land prices were driven by non-
fundamentals. In consequence, the existence of land price convergence is only a necessary 
condition but not sufficient for efficient land markets.  
There are several different empirical tests that could be used to investigate the time-series 
properties of spatial price data and that could also be employed to test for the Law of One Price. 
Starting from the principle that price levels, like many economic variables, exhibit strong trends 
and are not always stationary, one could investigate whether the behaviour of price levels can be 
characterized as having a unit root or rather if prices follow a mean reverting process. If price 
levels contain unit roots, then a one-off shock on prices will have permanent effects. However, if 
prices are stationary, then such shocks are temporary and will be eliminated as time passes. The 
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latter is, indeed, an indication of price convergence and, hence, of market integration. The 
estimated speed of price convergence indicates the degree of market integration.  
 
[HERE FIGURES 4a, 4b] 
 
Previous to econometric analysis, two straightforward measures of market integration are 
considered: the standard deviation and the coefficient of variance of relative land prices. These 
two measures would provide information as relative deviations from the Law of One Price 
decrease as time passes. Figure 4a shows that annual standard deviations for the logarithm of 
relative prices (with Barcelona’s land prices as the denominator) are about 90 percent at the 
beginning of the period considered, but decrease to an average of less than 80 percent at the end, 
which is an obvious downward trend in volatility from 1904 to 1934. However, this finding does 
not necessarily suggest convergence in relative prices because the means of prices could also shift 
over time. Therefore, a further analysis (Figure 4b) is carried out by dividing the standard 
deviations of relative prices by their mean in each year so that the effect can be normalized. This 
graph indicates that the mean does not move in the same direction as standard deviation in each 
year, therefore, the coefficient of variation also decreases over time. 
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002, hereafter LLC) and Im, Pesaran and Shin’s (2003, hereafter 
IPS) unit root tests with panel data provide a sound econometric approach for the Law of One 
Price. These two procedures are used because they are more powerful than the conventional unit 
root tests, or at least they improve the power of unit root tests because they provide a larger 
number of data points and use variation across individuals, thus improving estimation efficiency. 
These models also allow us to consider the relative version of this law, which has advantages over 
the absolute version which assumes that transaction costs vary proportionately over time. This 
could be done by introducing fixed effects in the estimation (Goldberg and Verboven, 2005). It 
should be noted that this procedure captures land market fixed effects that account for non-time 
dependence, landholding size differences, and unobserved quality differences.  
More specifically, the LLC test for the Spanish land market is carried out by estimating 
the following equation: 
3     ∆,  =  +   ,! + 	 ",!
#
$
+  %,, 
 
Where Pi,t is the logarithm-difference in the real price of land in province i relative to benchmark 
province at time t, and ∆ is the first difference operator. The primary interest is the coefficient on 
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the lagged logarithm of price differences, βi which represents the speed of convergence. Under 
the null of no convergence, βi is equal to zero for all i, suggesting that a shock to Pit is permanent. 
Using this βi coefficient, the half-life could also be computed as -ln(2)/ln(1+β). The half-life 
represents the period required to reduce a quantity to one-half of its original amount. Therefore, 
half-lives ranging from zero to one year, for example, indicate that we need less than one year to 
eliminate one-half of a deviation of relative prices from its equilibrium.  
This LLC test may be viewed as a pooled Dickey-Fuller (or augmented Dickey-Fuller) 
test, with different lag lengths across the units of the panel. Unlike alternative tests, it is efficient 
for panels of moderate size, between 10 and 250 individuals with 25 to 250 observations per 
individual (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002). A possible criticism of this approach is that the 
convergence results are sensitive to the choice of the benchmark unit (Parsley and Wei, 1996; 
Cecchetti et al, 2002; Goldberg and Verboven, 2005; Solakoglu and Goodwin, 2005). To address 
this criticism, this study adopts three alternative benchmarks (Barcelona, Biscay and Madrid) and 
also computes the values without adopting any benchmark unit (that is, introducing an average 
time trend into the calculations). Alternative tests are also available for two different prices: 
average prices of land sold and inherited. However, only the calculation based on average prices 
of land sold is relevant for our purposes.  Inherited land prices could be considered as sensibility 
tests. Note that the computed results are not substantially different in any of the alternative 
calculations (see table 4 below). 
The major limitation of the LLC tests is that βi is the same for all observations (that is, it 
assumes that the speed of convergence is identical across all locations). The IPS test extends the 
LLC framework to allow for heterogeneity in the value of βi under the alternative hypothesis. 
Thus, IPS tests the null hypothesis H0: βi against the alternative that H0: βi < 0 for at least one i. 
The last three columns of table 4 collect the result of applying the LLC test to our database on 
prices. 
Before proceeding, two caveats in the estimation procedure should be solved. The first is 
the selection of the number of lags to be included in successive calculations to account for 
possible serial correlation taking into account that each province in each panel had its own lag 
structure (note that both IPS and LLC tests allow for different lag lengths in each series). Thus, 
the lag structure was determined on a variety basis by running an augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
for each province (calculations are available upon request from the authors). The lag length was 
decided using Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) since Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) 
systematically tend to bias upwards the number of lags.  
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The second caveat is related to the fact that IPS and LLC tests assume cross-sectional 
independence when one would expect the presence of spatial dependence across provinces in the 
behaviour of land prices. Following Buettner (1999), one can distinguish between three types of 
spatial dependence. In the first type, unobserved regional characteristics, such as market 
accessibility, soil quality or climate, may be spatially correlated. A second type of spatial 
dependence arises from common shocks to contiguous regions, causing error auto-regression. 
Finally, spatial dependence might exist in the dependent variable or the regressors resulting from 
the similarity of production conditions in neighbouring provinces.  
In the paper, therefore, we correct for spatial dependence using a filtering procedure 
based on Getis and Ord (1992) because, to our knowledge, no other method is currently 
available.17 Therefore, in order to control for spatial effects, a two-step procedure is used. First, 
spatial autocorrelation is removed from the variables using a filter based on a Getis and Ord 
(1992) spatial association measure and, subsequently, IPS and LLC tests are run using the filtered 
variables. The filtering methodology is defined as follows: 
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where xi
F is the resulted spatially filtered variable, xij are original variables considered, wij are 
elements of the spatial weights matrix W, and δ is a distance parameter indicating the extent to 
which further distant observations are down-weighted. Following the approach of Badinger et al. 
(2004), we use the above mentioned spatial weights matrix without assigning over-proportionally 
decreasing importance to farther distant observations, i.e. we assume wij(δ) = (dij)
-δ with δ = 1, 
where dij denotes the railway distance between province capitals.
18 
 
[HERE TABLE 4] 
                                            
17 Alternative estimations, without spatial filtering, are available upon request from the authors but 
displayed very similar results (albeit slightly slower β coefficients). 
18 The railway distance between province capitals for the early 20th century has been kindly provided by 
Javier Silvestre. In the case of Balearic Islands, we add the maritime distance to/from Palma to the railway 
distance to the most closed Mediterranean port with regular ships to Palma. 
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The LLC tests reject the unit root hypothesis for all different specifications at 1 percent 
significance level. In all cases, the point estimates are negative and are significantly different from 
zero. IPS tests also reject the null hypothesis of unit roots. That is, the results show significant 
price convergence in every period for sales, and inheritance, relative prices, regardless of the 
specification of the panel model. As we predicted above, the results with no fixed effects indicate 
slower relative price convergence among provinces than results including fixed effects. In other 
words, the absolute version of the Law of One Price had less explanatory power than the relative 
version. On the other hand, in all cases, sales prices converge faster when compared to 
inheritance prices. In our preferred estimation (that is, sales with fixed effects and trend),19 the 
half-life for relative holding prices is estimated to be between 0.21-0.25 year.20 In other words, it 
takes around two-and-a-half months to a quarter-of-a-year for a one-off shock from the original 
relative price to be reduced by half. On the whole, these results indicate the presence of a highly 
integrated land market in Spain over the first third of the 20th century.  
 
[HERE TABLE 5] 
 
 Table 5 presents panel unit roots tests separately for the North and South of Spain. In the 
provinces of the North, small-medium landholdings predominated and direct cultivation was 
more common. Instead, in the Southern Spanish provinces, the size of landholdings was large 
and direct cultivation was much less common. Contemporaries tended to stress the inefficiency 
of Southern land markets given the presence of large landowners.21 As in seen table 4, all 
different tests for any location reject the unit root hypothesis at 1 percent significance level. More 
prominently, the estimated half-lives were commonly lower in Southern than in Northern 
provinces, which contradicts the above-mentioned view.     
 
5. Analysing Spanish land markets efficiency  
Another approach for considering the efficiency of Spanish land markets is the present 
value model (see equation 2 above). The model of real land prices requires that, if the real rent is 
stationary, then the price of land itself must also be stationary. Moreover, assuming a fixed 
                                            
19 This procedure corrects for local unobserved effects like land quality. 
20 In any case, these estimates are, if anything, downward-biased values of the “true” level of market 
integration. Taylor (2003) shows that, when convergence periods are shorter than reference periods, 
computed convergence speed is biased downwards. 
21 See Carrión (1932). 
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discount rate, land prices and rents must be cointegrated with a unit coefficient on rents 
(Gutierrez et al. 2007).22 If all these requirements hold, we can argue that land prices are driven by 
market fundamentals; that is, that land markets could be considered efficient. 
Unfortunately, data on rents are not available for Spain during the period considered. 
Instead, we have to resort to indirect measures of VMLP. Basically, we will employ the real 
agricultural value added per hectare as our main proxy for rents. Note that value added is a good 
substitute for rents only if technical progress is Hicks-neutral (that is, only if the share of land 
remains constant into gross value added over time).23 Consequently, we will test the following 
relationship directly by modifying equation 2: 
 
(5) ln V = β0 + β1 ln VA, 
 
where lnV is the logarithm of the real average price per hectare, lnVA is the real gross value 
added per hectare;24 and β0=ln(1/i) where ln is the natural logarithm. Note that the present value 
model only holds if β1=1 and under the assumption that lnVA = γ * lnR; where γ is a constant 
between 0 and 1 and lnR is the natural logarithm of real rents per hectare. 
The test of the present value model (equation 5) is conducted in three successive steps. 
First, we performed various second-generation panel cointegration tests (LLC and IPS) to 
determine the time series properties of the variables. It is evident from these tests that both series 
are stationary with the same two lags and without trend (the model had been selected with the 
BIC). The results are available upon request from the authors. 
We now proceed to test for cointegration. Our methodology is taken from Westerlund 
(2007), who develops four new panel tests based on the error correction model. The underlying 
                                            
22 However, a large part of the literature found no evidence supporting the present value model. 
According to Gutierrez et al. (2007), a possible explanation for the absence of empirical support for the 
present value model is that standard unit root and cointegration tests may not be powerful enough to 
detect cointegration when applied to single time series of short to moderate length. 
23 We have tested directly this assumption by regressing the logarithm of gross value added on the 
logarithm of cultivated hectares by province in three different periods (1904-1914; 1915-1924; 1925-1934) 
and with three alternative methods (OLS, fixed-effects panel regression, and random-effects panel 
regression). All variables have been previously corrected by geographical dependence according to 
equation 4. The results indicate that the coefficient of the logarithm of hectares is not significantly 
different across different periods, which is an indication of share stability. All calculations are available 
upon request from the authors. 
24 See appendix. 
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idea of Westerlund (2007) is to test for the absence of cointegration by determining whether 
there exists error correction for individual panel members or for the panel as a whole. Two of the 
tests, Gt and Ga, assume that the error correction coefficients are equal for all provinces. The 
second pair, Pt and Pa, does not require all coefficients to be equal, which means that the 
alternative is formulated as that at least one coefficient is larger than zero for at least one 
province. Thus, while a rejection by the first two tests provides evidence in favour of 
cointegration for all N provinces, this is not the case for the other two. It should be noted that 
these error correction tests use a scheme that accounts for both the time series and cross-
sectional dependencies of the regression error.  
 
[HERE TABLE 6] 
 
The computed values of the test statistics are presented in Table 6. Moreover, we include 
two sets of P-values; one is based on the asymptotic normal distribution, while the other is based 
on the bootstrapped distribution using 1,000 replications. At first sight, the no cointegration null 
is strongly rejected by all four tests when using the asymptotic p-values and also with 
bootstrapped p-values. Taken together these results are strong evidence in favour of 
cointegration between land prices per hectare and gross value added per hectare.  
Given the reassuring results of table 6, we consider several approaches to estimating the 
long-run (cointegrating) relationship between the variables. Kao and Chen (1995) show that the 
panel ordinary least squares (OLS) may result in a biased and non-normal distribution of the 
residuals. The problem is amplified in a panel setting by the potential dynamic heterogeneity over 
the cross-sectional dimension. Therefore, two alternative methods of panel cointegration 
estimation have been suggested: within-dimension estimator and between-dimension (group-
mean) estimator. Pedroni (2000) proposed a between-dimension fully modified OLS estimator 
(FMOLS) to accommodate heterogeneity amongst panel member. Subsequently, Kao and Chiang 
(2000) presented a panel within-dimension DOLS estimator based on including lags and leads of 
the first difference of the regressors in the estimated equation. However, Monte Carlo evidence 
in Kao and Chiang (2000) shows that the panel DOLS estimator outperforms both the OLS and 
the panel fully modified OLS (FMOLS) estimator. We pursue our analysis therefore, and estimate 
the idiosyncratic cointegration vectors using DOLS. 
 
[HERE TABLE 7] 
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Table 7 supports our hypothesis of efficient land markets. Thus, we find that real land 
prices and real gross value added to be cointegrated around a breaking intercept with a 
cointegrating slope not significantly different from one. This leads us to the conclusion that the 
present value model cannot be rejected. In other words, Spanish land markets could be 
considered efficient. 
 
6. Conclusions and Implications for Further Research 
In this study, we attempt to determine whether the inadequate performance of market 
institutions lay behind the relative backwardness of Spanish agriculture during the first decades of 
the 20th century. Although substantial research has been carried out into the relation between 
institutions and agrarian development in Spain, the literature lacks a comprehensive analysis of 
the performance of land markets. In particular, we sought to clarify whether or not land markets 
were efficient. To tackle this issue we considered the spatial integration of land markets across 
Spain and whether (or not) land prices were driven by market fundamentals.  
Several previous questions had to be addressed when considering spatial integration in 
land markets. First, our analysis required a sufficiently long series of real land prices. Using new 
data obtained from the Registrars’ handbooks, we were able to extend the nominal land prices 
series for all Spanish provinces from 1904 to 1934. We then deflated these series by the new rural 
consumer index. Second, to measure the level of market integration and the subsequent speed of 
convergence, we used the economic Law of One Price. Following previous studies on market 
integration, we opted to investigate the time-series properties of our land price data. To do so, we 
used unit root tests with panel data, LLC and IPS, which are more powerful than the widely used 
Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. These methods also allowed the introduction 
of fixed effects that account for landholding size and quality differences across provinces. 
However, before proceeding further, we corrected the series for spatial dependence and selected 
the number of lags to be included in calculations. Finally, we computed the tests with several 
alternative benchmark provinces to avoid the problem of sensitivity to the choice of benchmark 
unit.  
Overall, our estimates of land price convergence, under all methods and different 
specifications utilized, seem to indicate the existence of a fairly integrated land market in Spain. 
Although these results may be a good indicator of efficient market behavior, it could be the case 
that land price convergence was not only driven by market fundamentals but also by nationwide 
bubbles. For this reason, we pursued our investigation on the efficiency of Spanish land markets 
a little further by considering directly whether land prices could be explained with the present 
value model.  
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The analysis of the present value models shows that land prices were driven by market 
fundamentals. To do so, we constructed a new series of real value added per hectare. We then 
employed the three-step procedure suggested by Gutierrez et al. (2007), testing successively the 
order of stationarity of land prices per hectare and real value added per hectare, the cointegration 
between them and whether the slope of the regression of land prices on real value added is one.  
Our research demonstrates that the market reforms of the 19th century were enough to 
produce an efficient land market in Spain. In consequence, we cannot attribute the backwardness 
of Spanish agriculture to land markets. However, readers should not be deceived; we do not 
argue that the functioning of the land market is unimportant for economic development, simply 
that it does not serve to explain the backwardness of Spanish agriculture at the beginning of the 
20th century. It is likely that with less efficient land markets, the productivity of Spanish 
agriculture would have been lower than actually observed. 
There are several extensions of our analysis that would be useful. First, we would like to 
extend the analysis to other secondary markets, particularly to the credit markets. As the literature 
emphasizes, the development of property rights on land makes it easier for land to be used as 
credit collateral. However, if mortgage markets failed or were biased, favoring richer participants, 
access to land markets could be effectively restricted. In consequence, land markets could 
experience (as a result of this credit restriction) equity problems. Second, following this line of 
reasoning, it would be desirable to consider the access to land of landless peasants directly. In 
other words, we need to know how many days of work were necessary to buy an arable plot and 
how difficult it was for journeymen to enter the land market. Finally, it would be interesting to 
extend this analysis to other countries and historical periods. The Spanish experience contrasts 
sharply with today’s land markets in developing countries but the extent to which other 
European countries enjoyed similarly developed land markets requires investigation.  
 
Appendix: Data sources 
Land Price data 
Our study uses the information provided by the property register yearbooks (Anuario de la 
Dirección General). We used yearly data from 1904, the year that regular publication began, to 1934 
when the political upheavals and later the Civil War interrupted the series until the mid-1940s. 
Information is grouped by provinces (49),25 and includes the number and total value of farms 
                                            
25 However, we do not consider The Canary Islands in our calculations (this choice reduces our sample to 
a maximum of 48 observations per year). 
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registered by reason of sale, inheritance, gift, mortgage and first registration. The source also 
distinguishes between urban and rural properties.  
 
Gross Agricultural Value Added 
The gross agricultural value added was computed in the following way. The quantities of 
production of different agrarian products collected by GEHR (1991) were multiplied by the 
relative prices and the transforming coefficients provided by Simpson (1994). Then, these real 
values were converted into nominal values using the disaggregated agrarian prices provided by 
Prados de la Escosura (2003). Finally, current prices series were converted to real gross value 
added by deflating them using Rosés and Sánchez-Alonso’s rural price consumer index (2009). 
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Table 1. Number of Registered Landholdings Inherited and Sold, 1904-1934 
  
Inherited 
Holdings 
Number of 
holding sales 
Holding stock 
1951 
Inheritance/ 
Sales 
Inheritance/ 
Stock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Andalusia 671,511 929,984 1,635,300 0.72 0.41 
Ebro Valley 563,680 570,569 4,172,400 0.99 0.14 
Mediterranean 1,023,521 1,130,148 3,176,000 0.91 0.32 
North 396,587 560,441 9,655,000 0.71 0.04 
Northern Castile 1,195,394 997,387 12,586,500 1.20 0.09 
Southern Castile 848,892 646,361 4,396,300 1.31 0.19 
Spain  4,699,585 4,834,890 35,621,500 0.97 0.13 
Notes: We have grouped the provinces into six  macro-regions (following Rosés and Sánchez-Alonso, 
2004): Andalusia (Almeria, Cadiz, Cordoba, Granada, Huelva, Jaen, Malaga and Seville), Mediterranean 
(Gerona, Barcelona, Tarragona, Castellon, Valencia , Alicante and Murcia), Ebro Valley (Lerida, Saragossa, 
Huesca, Teruel, Logrono, Alava and Navarre), Southern Castile (Caceres, Badajoz, Albacete, Ciudad Real, 
Cuenca, Guadalajara, Madrid, Toledo), Northern Castile (Salamanca, Zamora, Leon, Valladolid, Palencia, 
Burgos, Soria, Segovia) and North (Corunna, Pontevedra, Lugo, Orense, Asturias, Santander, Gipuzcoa 
and Biscay).  
Sources: See Appendix. 
 
Table 2. The Relative importance (percent) of Spanish Land Markets, 1904-1934 
  
Holding sold per year / 
stock of holdings 
(1) 
Value of Sales /  
Output 1908-1913 
(2) 
Value of Sales /  
Output  1931 
(3) 
Andalusia 1.96 10.4 8.6 
Ebro Valley 0.47 5.5 4.7 
Mediterranean 1.23 8.8 6.4 
North 0.20 5.1 3.3 
Northern Castile 0.27 3.3 2.5 
Southern Castile 0.51 5.7 4.5 
Spain 0.47 6.8 5.1 
Notes: see table 1. All values in Ptas. of 1910. The prices are deflated by the rural consumer price deflator 
of Rosés and Sánchez-Alonso (2009). The amount of hectares had been estimated by multiplying the total 
amount of landholding sold by the average size of landholding in each province in 1874-75. 
Sources: The stock of holdings is from the agricultural census for 1951 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 
1951). Simpson (1994) provides data for the agricultural output at current prices. 
 
Table 3. The Regional Characteristics of Spanish Land Markets, 1904-1934 
 
Amount of 
Sales per year 
(1) 
Value of Sales per 
year (in 106 PTA.) 
 (2) 
 
 
Amount of ha. sold 
per year (in 103) 
 (3) 
Average 
Price 
per 
plot 
(4) 
 
Average 
Price 
per ha. 
(5) 
Andalusia 32,068 19.24 % 59.9 30.78 % 173.2 35.8 % 1,896.4  377.7 
Ebro Valley 19,674 11.80 % 17.1 8.79 % 41.9 8.7 % 873.0 473.7 
Mediterranean 38,970 23.38 % 51.4 26.41 % 70.4 14.6 % 1,341.4 767.2 
North 19,325 11.59 % 22.4 11.51 % 17.3 3.6 % 1,162.9 1,095.1 
Northern Castile 34,392 20.63 %  16.4 8.43 % 50.4 10.4 % 481.7 422.6 
Southern Castile 22,288 13.37 % 27.3 14.03 % 130.1 26.9 % 1,229.0 234.1 
Spain 166,720 100.00 % 194.6 100.00 % 483.3 100.0 % 1,167.8 434.4 
Notes: see table 2.  
Sources: see table 1.  
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Table 4. Panel Unit Root Tests for Spanish Land Markets, 1904-1934 
    Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) 
Dependent Specification Β T t-star p-val Half-life t-bar w-tbar p-val 
a) Barcelona Benchmark 
Sale NC -0.1560 -10.529 -10.199 0.0000 4.0860       
 F -0.8251 -29.092 -19.960 0.0000 0.3976 -4.206 -20.738 0.0000 
 FT -0.9515 -32.468 -19.010 0.0000 0.2290 -4.587 -20.236 0.0000 
Inheritance NC -0.0816 -7.383 -7.152 0.0000 8.1398    
 F -0.7515 -27.600 -19.296 0.0000 0.4979 -4.049 -19.589 0.0000 
 FT -0.9022 -31.302 -18.339 0.0000 0.2982 -4.458 -19.215 0.0000 
b) Biscay Benchmark 
Sale NC -0.1565 -10.659 -10.324 0.0000 4.0738       
 F -0.8262 -29.519 -20.735 0.0000 0.3961 -4.191 -20.663 0.0000 
 FT -0.9615 -33.527 -20.203 0.0000 0.2128 -4.565 -20.077 0.0000 
Inheritance NC -0.0815 -7.664 -7.422 0.0000 8.1513    
 F -0.7541 -28.412 -20.601 0.0000 0.4941 -4.123 -20.924 0.0000 
 FT -0.8947 -32.173 -19.951 0.0000 0.3080 -4.588 -20.356 0.0000 
c) Madrid Benchmark 
Sale NC -0.1256 -9.065 -8.783 0.0000 5.1626       
 F -0.7796 -26.094 -15.877 0.0000 0.4583 -3.705 -16.839 0.0000 
 FT -0.9353 -29.529 -15.275 0.0000 0.2531 -4.194 -16.910 0.0000 
Inheritance NC -0.0511 -5.303 -5.141 0.0000 13.2255    
 F -0.6857 -22.429 -12.143 0.0000 0.5989 -3.221 -13.144 0.0000 
 FT -0.8589 -25.664 -10.341 0.0000 0.3540 -3.624 -12.219 0.0000 
d) Without Benchmark (National average) 
Sale FT -0.9459 -34.094 -21.1075 0.0000 0.2376 -4.688 -21.389 0.0000 
Inheritance FT -0.9015 -32.763 -20.3152 0.0000 0.2991 -4.580 -20.504 0.0000 
Notes: All variables Geographically heterokedasticity corrected as described in the text. The lags have 
been selected on a variety basis with the BIC criterion by running ADF tests for each individual serie. NC: 
No constant (unconditional convergence); F: Fixed effects; FT: Fixed Effects and Time Trend; Half life 
(in years) is computed as – ln (2) / ln (1+β).  
Sources: See table 1. 
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Table 5. Panel Unit Root Tests for Spanish Land Sales Markets, 1904-1934:  
North / South comparison 
    Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) 
Macro-
Region 
Specification Β T t-star p-val Half-life t-bar w-tbar p-val 
a) Barcelona Benchmark 
North NC -0.1714 -9.107 -8.821 0.0000 3.6859   0.0000 
 F -0.7709 -22.427 -15.004 0.0000 0.4703 -3.833 -14.512 0.0000 
 FT -0.9195 -25.734 -14.756 0.0000 0.2751 -4.301 -14.498 0.0000 
South NC -0.1923 -6.327 -6.131 0.0000 3.2456   0.0000 
 F -0.8661 -17.753 -12.219 0.0000 0.3447 -4.270 -12.418 0.0000 
 FT -0.9524 -19.306 -11.572 0.0000 0.2276 -4.594 -11.871 0.0000 
b) Biscay Benchmark 
North NC -0.1610 -8.812 -8.535 0.0000 3.9477   0.0000 
 F -0.7742 -22.204 -14.813 0.0000 0.4659 -3.817 -14.407 0.0000 
 FT -0.9557 -26.138 -14.757 0.0000 0.2223 -4.322 -14.629 0.0000 
South NC -0.2123 -7.016 -6.797 0.0000 2.9052   0.0000 
 F -0.8738 -18.754 -13.617 0.0000 0.3349 -4.560 -13.773 0.0000 
 FT -0.9421 -20.108 -12.739 0.0000 0.2433 -4.764 -12.732 0.0000 
c) Madrid Benchmark 
North NC -0.1261 -7.644 -7.405 0.0000 5.1438   0.0000 
 F -0.7319 -20.000 -11.455 0.0000 0.5266 -3.480 -12.469 0.0000 
 FT -0.9225 -23.679 -11.255 0.0000 0.2711 -4.072 -13.114 0.0000 
South NC -0.1659 -5.436 -5.270 0.0000 3.8216   0.0000 
 FB -0.8637 -16.672 -11.038 0.0000 0.3479 -4.120 -11.325 0.0000 
 FT -0.9601 -18.259 -10.488 0.0000 0.2151 -4.443 -10.737 0.0000 
d) Without Benchmark (National average) 
North FT -0.9254 -27.282 -16.589 0.0000 0.2671 -4.565 -16.622 0.0000 
South FT -0.9478 -19.504 -11.874 0.0000 0.2347 -4.636 -12.084 0.0000 
Notes: See Table 4. The South macro-region is formed by Southern Castile and Andalusia while the 
remaining regions formed the North macro-region.  
Sources: See table 1. 
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Table 6. Cointegration test results of the present value model, 1904-1934 
  Value Z-value P-value Robust P-value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gt -4.021 -14.364 0.000 0.000 
Ga -23.164 -11.734 0.000 0.000 
Pt -28.419 -16.051 0.000 0.000 
Pa -24.080 -17.545 0.000 0.000 
Notes: We estimate the equation 5. All variables had been corrected for spatial dependence as is 
described above. The tests of Westerlund (2007) take no cointegration as the null hypothesis. The test 
regression is fitted with 4 (T/100)
2/9 
lags and leads. The P-values are for one-tailed test based on the 
normal distribution. The robust P-values are bootstrapped using 1,000 replications.  
Sources: See appendix. 
 
Table 7. DOLS estimates of the present value model, 1904-1934 
  Coefficient Std. Err. Z P>/z/ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
β0 1.6727 0.0198  8.44 0.000 
β1 0.9571 0.0423 22.62 0.000 
Wald Chi2 591.42    
R2 0.2827    
Notes: We estimate the equation 5. The method of estimations is instrumental variables (2SLS) 
regressions. The DOLS is fitted with 4 (T/100)
2/9 
lags and leads. Coefficients and standard errors are 
robust. All results and regression statistics are significant at 1 percent level. 
Sources: See table 6. 
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Figure 1. The evolution of land sales in Spain, 1904-1935 (1904/8 = 100). 
 
Notes: see table 2.  
Sources: see table 1. 
 
Figure 2. The evolution of average land prices in Spain, 1904-1935 (1904/8 = 100). 
 
Notes: see table 2.  
Sources: see table 1. 
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Figure 3a. Evolution of the amount of 
landholdings sold, 1904-34  
(Ebro V., Mediterranean and Andalusia) 
Figure 3b. Evolution of the amount of 
landholdings sold, 1904-34  
(N. Castile, S. Castile and North) 
  
Figure 3c. Evolution of the total real value of 
landholdings sold, 1904-34, in million Pta. 
(Ebro V., Mediterranean and Andalusia) 
Figure 3d. Evolution of the total real value of 
landholdings sold, 1904-34, in million Pta. 
(N. Castile, S. Castile and North) 
  
Figure 3e. Evolution of the real price of 
landholdings sold, 1904-34, in 1910 Pta. 
(Ebro V., Mediterranean and Andalusia) 
Figure 3f. Evolution of the real price of 
landholdings sold, 1904-34, in 1910 Pta. 
(N. Castile, S. Castile and North) 
  
Notes: see table 2.  
Sources: see table 1. 
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Figure 4a. Standard deviation of relative land 
prices, 1904-1934 
Figure 4b. Coefficient of variance for relative 
land prices, 1904-1934 
  
Notes: see table 2.  
Sources: see table 1. 
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